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U.N. Sovereign Immunity: Using the
Haitian Experience to Transition from
Absolute to Qualified Immunity
BRIANNA SAINTE*
The United Nations (“U.N.”) has been looked at globally
and historically as an international organization that has
given aid to millions of people in the hopes of promoting
peace and reducing human rights violations. It is no surprise
then that many countries have welcomed U.N. troops with
open arms in the hopes of stabilizing communities. However,
instead of receiving aid, imagine receiving a deadly disease.
Imagine having the nearby river that has been your only
*
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full of resilient people who carry with them a resilient pride for their country. It is
a beautiful country full of unspoken natural wonders. It is a fact that Haiti has
suffered throughout its history both financially and environmentally, the cause of
which can be traced to the negative treatment Haiti received from nation states
during the time of Haiti’s slave rebellion. The fact that Haiti is not remembered
as the first ever successful slave uprising is unfortunate. But Haiti nonetheless
deserves to be respected for the place it has in history, specifically black history.
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the final words of this Note.
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source of water for drinking, laundry, and bathing for decades turned into a waste dump. It is from that river turned
waste dump that you—and hundreds of thousands of other
innocent people—have now contracted cholera.
This was the reality for thousands of Haitian citizens
who now continue to suffer from cholera due to a U.N.
base’s negligent disposal of its troops’ waste into a river the
Haitian citizens depended on for survival. Despite being responsible for the cholera epidemic now plaguing Haiti—a
third world country with too few resources struggling to support its citizens—the U.N. has failed to not only properly respond to the outbreak, but also to accept legal responsibility
This Note discusses different options to bring about financial, legal, and actual relief to the victims of the cholera
outbreak in Haiti. It reviews the failed attempts of Haitian
victims to hold the U.N. legally accountable for its actions
and seeks to answer the following question: in what ways
can relief be achieved, if at all, in the human rights realm.
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INTRODUCTION
“[T]he maintenance of international peace and security” is the
mission statement put forth by the United Nations (“U.N.”), an intergovernmental organization created in 1945 in response to the
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tragedy of the World War II.1 What was once a fledgling alliance
between fifty-one member states to prevent another world war has
now grown into the largest intergovernmental organization comprising of 193 member states.2 To realize the U.N.’s mission, U.N.
peacekeeping troops are deployed to various parts of the world with
the responsibility of creating the infrastructure needed to establish
and maintain peace.3 However, this task involves a complex web of
international and domestic law and leaves large, gaping holes in jurisprudence concerning international organizations and the ability of
the U.N. to operate within those gaps without consequence or accountability.4
It is common practice for the U.N. to set up Status of Force
Agreements (“SOFAs”) between itself and the foreign state in which
peacekeeping troops are to be deployed.5 Under the 1994 Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel, all
involved parties, including nation states and U.N. subsidiaries, are
obliged to enter into SOFAs that cover all activities and personnel
associated with U.N. operations in a foreign state.6 SOFAs involving U.N. peacekeeping operations customarily contain an immunity
clause that reinforces the 1946 Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations (“General Convention”) and the
U.N. Charter.7 Together, the 1946 and 1994 conventions grant the
1

What We Do, UNITED NATIONS, http://www.UN.org/en/sections/what-wedo/ (last visited June 24, 2018).
2
History of the United Nations, UNITED NATIONS, http://www.UN.org/en/
sections/history/history-united-nations/ (last visited Sept. 14, 2018); International
Organization, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC, https://www.nationalgeographic.org/encyclopedia/international-organization/ (last visited Dec. 10, 2017); Member States,
UNITED NATIONS, http://www.UN.org/en/member-states/ (last visited Sept. 14,
2018).
3
International Organization, supra note 2.
4
See generally Rosa Freedman, U.N. Immunity or Impunity? A Human
Rights Based Challenge, 25 EUR. J. OF INT’L L. 239, 242–45 (2014) (discussing
developments in jurisprudence over the past fifty years moving away from giving
intergovernmental organizations absolute immunity).
5
Dieter Fleck, The Legal Status of Personnel Involved in the United Nations
Peace Operations, 95 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 613, 621 (2013).
6
Id. at 620–21; GA Res. 49/59, annex, Convention on the Safety of United
Nations and Associated Personnel (Dec. 9, 1994), 34 I.L.M. 482 [hereinafter
Safety Convention].
7
Safety Convention, supra note 6; see U.N. Charter art. 105, ¶ 1; Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations art. 2, Feb. 13, 1946,
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U.N. sovereign immunity and immunity for civilian personnel working on behalf of the U.N.8 While immunity is viewed as necessary
to ensure the effective performance of peace operations, SOFAs
drafted for U.N. peacekeeping operations provide countermeasures
to safeguard the rights of private citizens and the host country itself.9
It is these countermeasures, including alternative dispute resolution
mechanisms such as the establishment of claims commissions and
lump-sum payments, that the U.N. uses to justify the immunity
granted to it in the SOFAs.10 In theory, SOFAs are meant to help
close the gap between international and domestic law.11 In practice,
however, this goal is rarely ever reached.12
In recent years, questions have arisen regarding the lack of accountability when countermeasures included in SOFAs have failed
to be implemented, which has allowed for the actions of the U.N. to
go unchecked due to its benefit of receiving immunity.13 Such a failure is exemplified by the U.N.’s operations in Haiti over the last
seven years. In 2010, a cholera outbreak occurred that ravaged the
already devastated country of Haiti.14 When reports emerged that
the U.N. may have been responsible for the outbreak, the U.N. denied responsibility.15 With the cholera epidemic now affecting over
1 U.S.T. 1418, 1 U.N.T.S. 15. [hereinafter Privileges and Immunities Convention]; see also Freedman, supra note 4, at 247–8 (describing the immunities afforded by the U.N.’s Model SOFA).
8
Safety Convention, supra note 6; Privileges and Immunities Convention,
supra note 7; Freedman, supra note 4, at 243 (“[M]ost [states] insist that the
U.N. . . . retains absolute immunity.”).
9
Fleck, supra note 5, at 615–16 (describing the origins of immunity and its
application in peacekeeping operations); Freedman, supra note 4, at 247 (appraising the Model SOFA and its provisions for alternative dispute resolution mechanisms as countermeasures to peacekeepers’ immunity).
10
Freedman, supra note 4, at 241, 245–47.
11
See Fleck, supra note 5, at 621, 629–34 (discussing common tensions and
regulatory gaps that arise when international bodies and state governments negotiate and implement SOFAs).
12
Id.
13
See Freedman, supra note 4, at 246.
14
Somini Sengupta, U.N. Apologizes for Role in Haiti’s 2010 Cholera Outbreak, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 1, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016 /12/01/world/
americas/united-nations-apology-haiti-cholera.html.
15
Id.; Kristina Duagirdas & Julian Davis Mortenson, Contemporary Practice
of the United States Relating to International Law, 108 AM. J. INT’L L. 784, 819
(2014).
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hundreds of thousands of Haitian victims, a global spotlight has
been placed on the ramifications felt by Haitian victims who have
yet to obtain monetary relief from the operations conducted by U.N.
peacekeepers within that region.16
Many international news articles and journals have focused on
the epidemic in Haiti and the U.N.’s lack of accountability.17 This
Note will focus on possible avenues of relief for Haitian victims. It
will also address as future policy solutions that combat U.N. immunity in the hope that, in the midst of the complex conversation concerning how the U.N. will be allowed to operate in the future, the
victims who were affected by the cholera outbreak may somehow
achieve the justice they deserve.
Part I of this Note will summarize the beginnings of the cholera
outbreak in Haiti as well as its impact on the locals, thereby detailing
the foundation for the causal element of a legal framework that will
also be discussed. Part II will examine the legal arguments presented
by the victims in a previous petition to the U.N. as well as civil actions brought in United States federal courts. Part III will detail the
lives of just a few of the victims of the cholera outbreak, so as to
remember those victims and survivors who are sometimes forgotten.
Finally, Part IV will examine the idea of using a human-rights based
approach to challenge the U.N.’s absolute immunity. It will also discuss how such a challenge can lead to the emergence of a new norm
in which the U.N. operates under a modified immunity.
I. ORIGINS OF THE CHOLERA OUTBREAK IN HAITI
In August 2016, six years after the first cases of cholera were
reported in 2010, then Secretary General Ban Ki-moon of the U.N.
16

Randal C. Archibold & Somini Sengupta, U.N. Struggles to Stem Haiti
Cholera Epidemic, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 19, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/
04/20/world/americas/U.N.-struggles-to-stem-haiti-cholera-epidemic.html;
Sengupta, supra note 14.
17
See, e.g., American Society of International Law, Contemporary Practice
of the United States Relating To International Law, 111 AM. J. INT’L L. 155, 162
(2017); Thomas G. Bode, Cholera in Haiti: United Nations Immunity and Accountability, 47 GEO. J. INT’L L. 759 (2016); Farhana Choudhury, The United Nations Immunity Regime: Seeking a Balance between Unfettered Protection and
Accountability, 104 GEO. L.J. 725 (2016); Duagirdas & Mortenson, supra note
15, at 819; Devika Hovell, Due Process in the United Nations, 110 AM. J. INT’L
L. 1 (2016).
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publicly acknowledged, for the first time, that the U.N. “played a
role” in the cholera outbreak in Haiti.18 The public announcement
also came five years after an independent, four-person panel of experts launched a full-scale investigation, under U.N. auspices, and
quietly released a report in 2011 that came to a similar conclusion.19
Cholera, “an acute, diarrheal illness caused by infection of the
intestine with the bacterium Vibrio cholera,” is usually spread by
the ingestion of contaminated food or water.20 Though the infection
is often mild and can result in no symptoms at all, symptoms can
turn severe and lead to death if treatment, such as proper rehydration, is not administered.21 Symptoms include severe dehydration,
extreme vomiting, dizziness, and diarrhea.22
The source of the initial cholera outbreak in Haiti was traced to
a U.N. base located in the rural Centre Department of Haiti.23 Specifically, the base was a United Nations Stabilisation Mission in
Haiti (“MINUSTAH,” an acronym of the French name) camp located in the Mirebalais commune, which was constructed in 2004.24
The victims of the first cholera cases in over half a century lived
near the MINUSTAH camp, which at the time quartered U.N.
peacekeepers who had just arrived from Nepal.25 The Nepalese soldiers arrived between October 8th and October 24th of 2010.26
Though it was customary to conduct a basic health screening for
U.N. troops, the U.N. did not require testing for individuals who
failed to show any active signs of an infectious disease.27 Therefore,

18

Jonathan M. Katz, U.N. Admits Role in Cholera Epidemic in Haiti, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 17, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/18/world/americas/united-nations-haiti-cholera.html.
19
ALEJANDO CRAVIOTO ET AL., FINAL REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT PANEL
OF EXPERTS ON THE CHOLERA OUTBREAK IN HAITI 29 (2011).
20
Cholera – Vibrio cholerae infection, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/cholera/general/index.html (last visited Dec. 11,
2017).
21
Id.
22
Id.
23
CRAVIOTO, supra note 19, at 20–23; Duagirdas & Mortenson, supra note
15, at 819.
24
CRAVIOTO, supra note 19, at 8.
25
Katz, supra note 18.
26
CRAVIOTO, supra note 19, at 12.
27
Freedman, supra note 4, at 240.
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Nepalese troops did not undergo any testing for cholera before deployment to Haiti.28 Rumors of a possible connection between the
newly-arrived Nepalese soldiers and the sudden cholera outbreak
began to spread, despite the initial denial of causation by senior officers.29 The rumors were further bolstered when the World Health
Organization reported that Nepal suffered from a cholera outbreak
in August 2010, leaving 1,400 people infected and eight dead.30
The initial inspection of the MINUSTAH camp itself revealed a
poor and faulty waste system.31 The construction of the water pipes
from the main toilet and shower area were deemed “haphazard” and
posed a serious risk of cross-contamination. 32 Inspectors observed
that several of the pipes crossed over a drainage ditch that ran from
the camp and flowed directly into the Meye Tributary System
(“Meye”).33 Furthermore, contractors hired by MINUSTAH staff
were seen disposing waste from the camp into a septic pit atop a hill
that was not only open and unsecure, but also only a short walking
distance from the southeast branch of the Meye.34 The disposal site
was “susceptible to flooding,” causing it to overflow into the Meye,
which in turn flowed directly into the Artibonite River.35 The importance of the Artibonite River to the Haitian community cannot
be overstated as it is not only a place for recreation and washing, but
also is the source of water thousands use to bathe, drink, and irrigate
their crops.36
After its investigation of the MINUSTAH camp, the panel conducted comparative testing with cholera strains in Haiti and those
found in various parts of the world.37 The testing method used,
known as Multiple-Locus Variable number tandem repeat Analysis
(“MLVA”), found that the isolated Haitian strains were all closely
28

Id.
Nita Bhalla, U.N. Peacekeepers Not to Blame for Haiti's Cholera - Nepalese Army, REUTERS (Nov. 10, 2010), https://www.reuters.com/article /idINIndia52626220101102.
30
Id.
31
CRAVIOTO, supra note 19, at 21–23.
32
Id. at 21.
33
Id.
34
Id. at 22.
35
Id.
36
Id. at 29.
37
Id. at 25–26.
29
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related to the cholera strains found in Nepal in 2009, as well as other
regions within South Asia.38 The data collected confirmed that the
cholera outbreak did not originate within the Haitian community itself, but was introduced by something foreign.39 While the panel report did not explicitly connect the Nepalese soldiers to the cholera
outbreak in Haiti, the research did point to such a connection, and it
was confirmed five years later by the U.N. secretary.40
In a country in where citizens had little access to clean water,
and were already suffering from the devastating 2010 Haitian earthquake, the leakage of waste into the Artibonite River had devastating effects.41 Within ten weeks of the first cholera outbreak in the
communities surrounding the river, the disease had spread to all ten
departments or provinces of the country.42 In two years, the disease
killed 7,000 people and, as of the end of 2017, it has been the cause
of death for over 10,000 Haitians and led to the hospitalization of
over a million people.43
Victims of cholera suffer from continuous vomiting and diarrhea
and, due to the lack of hospital resources within Haiti, the disease
itself has persisted for years.44 The poor healthcare system was compounded by the U.N.’s delayed response in combating the epidemic
because of its reluctance to admit its role in the cholera outbreak.45
Had there been a more vigorous and efficient response by the U.N.
when the disease first broke out, the effects would have been minimized and the disease contained.46
Not only did the U.N. fail to appropriately respond to the cholera
outbreak when it first occurred, which lead to the disease’s rapid
38

Id. at 27–28.
Id. at 28.
40
Id. at 29; Katz, supra note 18.
41
See Sengupta, supra note 14.
42
Alex Weppelmann, Has Haiti’s Cholera Epidemic Become a Permanent
Problem?, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 11, 2016, 1:57 PM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/the-conversation-us/has-haitis-cholera-epidem_b_9662348.html.
43
Haiti Cholera Epidemic Kills 7,000, UPI (Jan. 7, 2012, 11:30 AM),
https://www.upi.com/Haiti-cholera-epidemic-kills-7000/34891325953846/; Rick
Gladstone, U.N. Brought Cholera to Haiti. Now It Is Fumbling Its Effort to Atone.,
N.Y. TIMES (June 26, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/ 2017/06/26/world/americas/cholera-haiti-united-nations-peacekeepers-yemen.html.
44
Archibold & Sengupta, supra note 16.
45
Sengupta, supra note 14.
46
Id.
39

342

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73:334

spread, but also the U.N. has only recently created a plan for eradication—a plan that does not seem achievable.47 At the time of admission in 2016, Secretary Ban Ki-moon announced the “New Approach” plan to eradicate cholera from the country.48 The plan detailed the need for $400–500 million to (1) support cholera control
and response, (2) restructure Haiti’s sanitation system, and (3) provide assistance to those who were affected by the epidemic.49 As of
October 2018, however, only $9 million has been raised thanks to
the voluntary donations from countries including Nepal, South Korea, France, Chile, India, and Liechtenstein.50 The fund ran dry in
early 2017, leading to pleas from Antonio Guterres, Mr. Ban’s successor as U.N. Secretary, to other member states for contributions.51
However, as of October 2018, total funds remain at just $9 million.52
Without a steady stream of funds and donations, efforts to control
the spread of cholera in Haiti, as well as attempts to bring justice for
the thousands of victims, will be futile.53
II. THE UPHILL LEGAL BATTLE
A. Petition to the United Nations
With an admission of causation from the U.N., coupled with the
lack of voluntarily given resources, Haitian victims have attempted
to seek relief through the legal system, though that too has yet to
47

Editorial Board, U.N. Accepts Blame but Dodges the Bill in Haiti, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 21, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/21/opinion/U.N.-accepts-blame-but-dodges-the-bill-in-haiti.html; see G.A. Res. A/71/L.42, The New
United Nations Approach to Cholera in Haiti (Dec. 12, 2016).
48
Editorial Board, supra note 47; U.N. Haiti Cholera Response Multi-partner Trust Fund, UNITED NATIONS, http://mptf.undp.org/factsheet /fund/CLH00
(last visited October 4, 2018).
49
New U.N. System Approach on Cholera in Haiti, UNITED NATIONS,
http://www.UN.org/News/dh/infocus/haiti/Haiti_U.N._System_Cholera.pdf (last
visited Dec. 15, 2017).
50
U.N. Haiti Cholera Response Multi-partner Trust Fund, supra note 48. The
countries that have donated as of October 2018 include the Bahamas, Belgium,
Belize, Canada, Côte d’Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Grenada, Guyana, India, Ireland,
Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Mexico, Myanmar, Nepal, the
Netherlands, Norway, Palau, Paraguay, Portugal, Senegal, Slovak Republic, Sri
Lanka, Sudan, Ukraine, Uruguay and Venezuela. Id.
51
Gladstone, supra note 43.
52
U.N. Haiti Cholera Response Multi-partner Trust Fund, supra note 48.
53
Id.
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yield any results. The victims’ first plan of recourse was to petition
the MINUSTAH’s Claims Unit and the U.N. Headquarters shortly
after the Independent Panel report was released.54 On November 3,
2011, lead lawyers Mario Joseph and Brian Cocannon Jr., from the
Bureau des Avocats Internationau (“BAI”) and the Institute for Justice & Democracy in Haiti (“IJDH”), filed the petition on behalf of
over 5,000 victims of the cholera outbreak and referenced the findings of the Independent Panel report to prove the element of causation.55 The petition argued that the U.N. had jurisdiction over the
claims of the victims as mandated by the SOFA between Haiti and
the U.N. under Article VII, ¶ 54 and Article VIII, ¶ 55, and as such
had the ability to hear the claims.56 The excerpt from the SOFA between Haiti and the U.N. reads as follows,
Third-party claims for property loss or damage
and for personal injury, illness or death arising from
or directly attributed to MINUSTAH, except for
those arising from operational necessity, which cannot be settled through the internal procedures of the
United Nations, shall be settled by the United Nations in the manner provided for in paragraph 55 of
the present Agreement . . . .
Except as provided in paragraph 57, any dispute
or claim of a private-law character, not resulting
from the operational necessity of MINUSTAH, to
which MINUSTAH or any member thereof is a party
and over which the courts of Haiti do not have jurisdiction because of any provision of the present

54
Petition from the Institute for Justice & Democracy in Haiti to the U.N.
Chief Claims Unit and the Office of the United Nations Secretary-General, INST.
FOR JUST. & DEMOCRACY IN HAITI (Nov. 3, 2011), http://ijdh.org/wordpress/wpcontent/uploads/2011/11/englishpetitionREDACTED.pdf [hereinafter Petition].
55
Id. at 1, 8–12.
56
Id. at 16; Agreement Concerning the Status of the United Nations Operation in Haiti, U.N.-Haiti, July 9. 2009, 2271 U.N.T.S 251, 261–62
http://ijdh.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/4-Status-of-ForcesAgreement-1.pdf [hereinafter Agreement].
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Agreement shall be settled by a standing claims commission to be established for that purpose.57
With the Petition filed in accordance with the statute of limitations, the Petitioners requested that a standing claims commission
be created to hear their claims and provide reparations.58 It was alleged in the Petition that the U.N. was liable for negligence, gross
negligence, and recklessness as a result of the poor sanitation construction of the MINUSTAH camp and the U.N.’s lack of response. 59 The failed response, therefore, violated Haitian civil, criminal, and constitutional law as mandated by the SOFA, as well as the
rights afforded to the Petitioners under international human rights
law.60
Based on these allegations, the Petitioners entreated the U.N. to
fairly and impartially adjudicate the claims through the creation of
a commission and to provide compensation for both the Petitioners
and other victims not listed in the petition.61 Unfortunately for the
Petitioners, their claims and requests for relief fell on deaf ears. After fifteen months of evaluation without a response, a letter was written to Mr. Concannon from Patricia O’Brien, the Legal Counsel of
the Secretary-General for Legal Affairs.62 The two-page document,
dated February 12, 2013, mostly detailed the many acts of charity
bestowed upon Haiti through U.N. efforts to control the spread of
cholera, but never admitted the fact that the U.N. was responsible
for the spread of the disease.63 Yet, in only a single paragraph comprised of two sentences did the U.N. directly respond to the claims
actually submitted.64 Within the letter, O’Brien uses Section 29 of

57

Agreement, supra note 56, at 261–62.
Petition, supra note 54, at 17. It may be noted that prior to the claimants’
petition, no standing claims commission had ever been established in spite. Freedman, supra note 4, at 247.
59
Petition, supra note 54, at 18–25.
60
Id.
61
Id. at 33–36.
62
Letter from the Patricia O’Brien, Legal Counsel of the Sec’y-Gen. for Legal Affairs, to Brian Concannon, Esq., Director, Institute for Justice & Democracy
in Haiti (Feb. 21, 2013), http://opiniojuris.org/wp-content/uploads/LettertoMr.BrianConcannon.pdf [hereinafter Letter].
63
Id.
64
Id.
58
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the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations to justify why the claims of the Haitian victims were not receivable.65 Per that section,
[t]he United Nations shall make provisions for appropriate modes of settlement of: (a) Disputes arising
out of contracts or other disputes of a private law
character to which the United Nations is a party; (b)
Disputes involving any official of the United Nations
who by reason of his official position enjoys immunity, if immunity has not been waived by the Secretary-General.66
This section was intended to counterbalance the absolute immunity enjoyed by the U.N. and its subsidiaries.67 However, the
U.N. found the claims of the Haitian victims to be contrary to Section 29’s requirement that disputes arise out of a private nature.68
Instead, the U.N. found that the “claims would necessarily include a
review of political and policy matters,” making the dispute one of
public law rather than private.69
The U.N. never further explained why it labeled the claims as
public law.70 The letter did not provide a definition as to what is and
what is not considered public versus private law in the context of
international or domestic affairs, and neither does the General Convention.71 Though there does not seem to be an international consensus on a definition, Black’s Law dictionary defines public law as
“[t]he body of law dealing with the relations between private individuals and the government, and with the structure and operation of
the government itself; constitutional law, criminal law, and administrative law taken together.”72 Therefore, because the alleged tortious actions arose out of the execution of the SOFA between the
65

Id.
Privileges and Immunities Convention, supra note 7, art. 8, § 29.
67
See Kristen Boon, U.N. Flatly Rejects Haiti Cholera Claim, OPINIO JURIS
(Feb. 22, 2013, 1:35 AM), http://opiniojuris.org/2013/02/22/U.N.-flatly-rejectshaiti-cholera-claim/.
68
See Privileges and Immunities Convention, supra note 7, art. 8, § 29.
69
Letter, supra note 62, at 2.
70
Id.
71
Id.; see also Privileges and Immunities Convention, supra note 7.
72
Public Law, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (5th pocket ed. 1996).
66

346

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73:334

state of Haiti and the U.N., it is possible that the Petition and its
claims are partly public.73
However, it also seems that many aspects of the petition describe
the kind of dispute seen in private law. Contrary to public law, private law is defined as “[t]he body of law dealing with private persons and their property and relationships.”74 One important observation is that the state of Haiti was not listed as a petitioner.75 In fact,
Haiti deliberately removed itself from the dispute between its citizens and the U.N.76 Given the definition of public law, the question
remains as to how a legal dispute can be deemed public if the state
itself does not intervene or have a stake in the outcome.77 The claim
is one of negligence, a quintessential tort, and has been brought forth
by private individuals who seek relief in the form of monetary damages, which is comparable to United States citizens who file suit
against major corporations.78 The claim, filed by the Petitioners
against the U.N., seems to have no impact on the operations of Haiti
or on how the U.N. conducts itself within other parts of the world.
Nevertheless, the petition was rejected without adequate explanation. The sting of rejection was followed by the realization that
the dismissal left the claimants with no venue to bring a legal case
since, as already discussed, a standing claims commission was never
put into place.79 The U.N.’s rejection of the Petition cannot be appealed, leaving only the option of suing in a national court, to which,
of course, the U.N. could and would simply assert its absolute immunity given to it by the General Convention.80 Though a losing
battle, the victims had no other choice but to bring their case to a
national court.
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Private Law, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (5th pocket ed. 1996).
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Boon, supra note 67.
80
Id.

2018]

U.N. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY: USING THE HAITIAN EXPERIENCE

347

B. Legal Case Brought in the United States: Georges v.
United Nations
After the U.N.’s rejection of their Petition, victims of the cholera
epidemic decided to file a federal complaint in New York.81 According to the IJDH, the claim was purposefully brought in the United
States instead of in Haiti.82 One major reason cited was Haiti’s lack
of a class action mechanism within the court system, which led the
legal team to believe that the Haitian court system may have lacked
the resources necessary to host such a large-scale legal case. 83 Also,
some Plaintiffs within the class, as well as two individual Defendants, were United States citizens and residents.84 Some of those
American citizens had lost family members to cholera or became
victims themselves.85 Finally, doubts regarding the impartiality of
Haiti’s judiciary also played a role in the decision to bring the case
to the United States. 86
On October 9, 2013, BAI and IJDH along with the law firm Kurzban, Kurzban, Weinger, Tetzelli & Pratt (“KKWT”) filed a class
action suit against the U.N., MINUSTAH, Secretary-General Ban
ki-Moon and Assistant Secretary-General Mulet.87 The Complaint
contained a myriad of allegations.88 Chief amongst the allegations
were, similar to the Petition, negligence on the part of the Defendants, as well as a breach of contract stemming from the U.N.’s unwillingness to create a standing claims commission as agreed upon
in the SOFA between the U.N. and Haiti.89 In addition to the Complaint, the Plaintiffs also submitted a request that the court affirm
that proper service had been made to the U.N. and other Defendants,
81

Cholera Litigation FAQ, INST. FOR JUST. & DEMOCRACY IN HAITI
http://www.ijdh.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/IJDH-Cholera-FAQ-pageMay-2018.pdf, (last visited Dec. 22, 2017); see also Cholera Accountability, INST.
FOR JUST. & DEMOCRACY IN HAITI, http://www.ijdh.org/choleraaccountability/
(last visited Dec. 22, 2017).
82
Cholera Litigation FAQ, supra note 81.
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Id.
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Complaint at 1, Georges v. United Nations, 84 F. Supp. 3d 246 (S.D.N.Y.
2015) (No. 13 Civ. 7146), http://www.ijdh.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/
Georges-v.-United-Nations-Complaint.pdf [hereinafter Complaint].
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Complaint, supra note 87, at 52–65.
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or that an alternative means of service be provided along with the
adequate time to do so.90
In response to the Complaint, the U.N. chose not to formally respond and, instead, had the United States government seek a dismissal on its behalf.91 The United States Department of Justice submitted a Statement of Interest on March 7, 2014.92 Within the Statement, the U.S. recognized its duty as host nation to the U.N. to bear
the responsibility of representing the U.N.93 The United States
brought to the court’s attention that the U.N. enjoys absolute immunity and more importantly, that it never expressly waived such
immunity.94 According to the U.N. Charter,
The Organization shall enjoy in the territory of each
of its Members such privileges and immunities as are
necessary for the fulfilment of its purposes . . . Representatives of the Members of the United Nations
and officials of the Organization shall similarly enjoy
such privileges and immunities as are necessary for
the independent exercise of their functions in connection with the Organization.95
Section 2 of the General Convention further augments this immunity by explaining that “[t]he United Nations, its property and
assets wherever located and by whomsoever held, shall enjoy immunity from every form of legal process except insofar as in any
particular case it has expressly waived its immunity shall extend to
any particular case it has expressly waived its immunity.”96
90

Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Affirmation that
Service of Complaint has Been Made at 5, Georges v. United Nations, 84 F. Supp.
3d 246 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (No. 13 Civ. 7146), http://www.ijdh.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/5-Memorandum-of-law-in-support-of-motion-for-affirmationthat-service-has-been-made.pdf [hereinafter Plaintiffs’ Memorandum]; Statement
of Interest for U.S. Department of Justice at 1, Georges, 84 F. Supp. 3d 246 (No.
13 Civ. 7146), https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/244540.pdf [hereinafter Statement of Interest]; cf. Petition, supra note 54, at 1, 16, 18–20.
91
Cholera Accountability, supra note 81.
92
Statement of Interest, supra note 90, at 2; see 28 U.S.C. § 517 (2012).
93
Statement of Interest, supra note 90, at 2.
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Id. at 3–5.
95
U.N. Charter art. 105 ¶ 1–2.
96
Privileges and Immunities Convention, supra note 7, art. 2, § 2.
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As such, though it was admitted that the U.N. and MINUSTAH
failed to erect the standing claims commission, the United States argued that the U.N.’s immunity still applied.97 Furthermore, the
United States Department of Justice argued that the individual Defendants, Secretary-General Ban ki-Moon and Assistant SecretaryGeneral Mulet, also had the protection of immunity under the same
clauses.98 With all of the Defendants being immune, the United
States contended that the Plaintiffs’ attempted service was, for lack
of a better term, useless.99 Also within the General Convention is the
condition that a service of legal process can be done in the headquarters district only with the approval of the Secretary-General, and
because no approval was given, the Plaintiffs had not formally
served the Defendants.100
With the filing of both Complaint and Response, the district
court held oral arguments on October 23, 2014.101 The major dispute
during oral argument revolved around whether failure to comply
with Section 29 of the General Convention by providing an alternative means of settlement constituted a waiver of the U.N.’s immunity.102
The biggest hurdle the court asked the Plaintiffs to overcome
was that of Brzak v. United Nations.103 Brazk was a Second Circuit
decision that dismissed the Plaintiff’s suit against the U.N. due to a
lack of subject matter jurisdiction.104 In Brzak, the plaintiff argued
that the failure of the U.N. to provide an adequate means of settlement indicates a waiver of immunity.105 In the opinion, however, the
Second Circuit found that the General Convention makes it absolutely clear that the U.N. enjoys immunity unless expressly waived
under Section 2.106 To allow the plaintiff’s argument to stand would
97
98
99
100

Statement of Interest, supra note 90, at 5–6.
Id. at 7.
Id. at 8.
Id. at 8; Privileges and Immunities Convention, supra note 7, art. III, §

9(a).
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Oral Argument at 1, Georges v. United Nations, 84 F. Supp. 3d 246
(S.D.N.Y. 2015) (No. 13 Civ. 7146), http://www.ijdh.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/Oral-Argument_Cholera-Case-10.23.pdf.
102
Id. at 4–5.
103
Id. at 7; Brzak v. United Nations, 597 F.3d 107 (2d Cir. 2010).
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Brzak, 597 F.3d at 111–12.
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Id. at 112.
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essentially remove the word “expressly” from the General Convention.107 Finally, the court concluded that the United States’s ratification of the General Convention meant that the Convention was not
only binding on the United States as a matter of international law,
but that its self-executing ability meant that it had domestic legal
effect as well.108
To circumvent the decision in Brzak, the Plaintiffs argued that
the legal question they brought was one of first impression.109 The
Plaintiffs contended that they were not arguing the legal question of
waiver, but instead were arguing that a breach of contract had occurred, particularly a breach of Section 29.110 The Plaintiffs interpreted Brzak as not addressing the legal question of a breach of the
General Convention’s other provisions. Rather, the Plaintiffs argued
that a breach of Section 29 made the existence of a waiver question
null and void because it rendered immunity completely gone and,
therefore, eliminated the question of whether a waiver occurred.111
According to the Plaintiffs, Section 29 was a condition precedent to
Section 2 of the General Convention, and by breaching Section 29,
the Defendants could no longer enjoy the benefit of the bargain, the
benefit being immunity.112
The Plaintiffs also pointed to both the language of the text and
the drafting history to argue that Section 29 and Section 2 of the
General Convention should be read together.113 Section 29 uses the
word “shall” when speaking of creating a mechanism by which settlements can be reached.114 In addition, notes from the drafting committee of the General Convention display a concern by the committee that if the U.N. were to be shielded from legal action in courts,
then an alternative means of settlement must be created.115
The court agreed with the United States Department of Justice
and found that Plaintiffs’ argument fell short in overcoming the

107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115

Id.; Privileges and Immunities Convention, supra note 7, at art. II, § 2.
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Id. at 9–11.
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broad language of Brzak.116 In a decision dated January 5, 2015, the
district court concluded that Brzak’s holding was binding on the
Plaintiffs’ case and, as such, encompassed the argument of a provision of the General Convention being breached.117 The court held
that all Defendants enjoyed absolute immunity because Section 29
did not act as a condition precedent to the immunity granted in Section 2.118 As a result, the Plaintiffs’ request for the court to affirm
proper service was denied for mootness.119
On appeal, the Plaintiffs alleged that the district court erred in
its holding and that its application of the General Convention to dismiss their claims violated their right of access to the federal courts
under constitutional law.120 On August 18, 2016, the Second Circuit
upheld the district court’s finding that Section 29 did not act as a
condition precedent and that the U.N. and all its members still enjoyed absolute immunity.121 In regard to whether the dismissal was
a violation of the right to access the courts, the Second Circuit concluded that the Plaintiffs’ argument did nothing more “than question
why immunities in general should exist.”122 To allow for such an
argument would call into question not just U.N. immunity, but other
immunities such as judicial, prosecutorial, and legislative immunity.123 Finally, the Second Circuit found no need to go into the merits
of the Plaintiffs’ first impression argument concerning the issue of
a material breach of a provision within the General Convention.124
Instead, the Second Circuit found that the Plaintiffs lacked standing
to even bring such an argument as it was decided in a previous decision, United States v. Garavito-Garcia, that “individuals have no
standing to challenge violations of international treaties in the absence of protest by the sovereign involved.”125
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The Second Circuit’s decision seemed to extinguish the last
hope left for the victims of the cholera outbreak in Haiti. The legal
counsel for the victims gave the impression that they knew the
chances of the United States Supreme Court granting cert, and then
reversing the Second Circuit’s decision, were less than slim—as
suggested by the fact that the Plaintiffs failed to file cert. It seemed
the U.N. recognized this as well, as it was the very next day that the
organization finally made its public announcement accepting responsibility for the outbreak.126
III. THE AFTERTHOUGHTS
It has been eight years since the cholera outbreak in Haiti began,
and while the legal battle for justice in the United States has almost
certainly come to an end, the suffering from the cholera epidemic in
Haiti has not. All too common is the image of an invalid man being
carried in a wheelbarrow to the nearest run-down medical facility,
in the desperate hope of being treated for a disease that could be
easily treated in a developed country that had the adequate resources
needed.127 At this juncture, it is imperative to tell a few personal
stories of the victims because, as its placement within the latter half
of this Note foreshadows, the stories of Haitian victims are either an
afterthought or completely forgotten.
Monsieur Fritznel Paul was a father of two with a wife and five
siblings.128 On October 1, 2012, while working in the fields, Paul
fell victim to an onslaught of symptoms associated with the infection
of cholera, including vomiting and diarrhea.129 The dehydration was
so severe that he no longer had the strength to stand, let alone
126

See Katz, supra note 18.
Cholera Epidemic Continues to Claim Lives in Haiti, GUARDIAN (Nov. 23,
2010, 12:00 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/gallery/2010/nov/23/haiti-cholera-outbreak [hereinafter Cholera Epidemic Continues]. “No one should get cholera, and no one who gets it should die. The cure is
astoundingly simple: clean water and rehydrating salts, given intravenously if necessary, can swiftly bring a person back from the edge of death. The long-term
solution, clean water and sewage systems, is straightforward.” Editorial Board,
Opinion, Haiti in the Shadow of Cholera, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 23, 2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/24/opinion/haiti-in-the-shadow-of-cholera.html [hereinafter Haiti in the Shadow of Cholera].
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walk.130 Paul’s family was informed that he was suffering from
cholera after being treated with oral rehydration solutions at a hospital in Mirebalais.131 Every member of Paul’s family depended on
river water from the Artibonite River to support various aspects of
their lives, including drinking and washing.132 Within seven days,
during which he continuously suffered from vomiting, Paul died at
the age of 34.133 He left behind his mother, five siblings, wife, and
two young daughters.134 His family was afflicted not only with grief,
but also by the debts they incurred to pay for Paul’s funeral and
medical expenses.135 This debt led to Paul’s eleven-year-old daughter being pulled out of school because the family could no longer
pay for her tuition.136
The story of Delis Georges, a United States resident, began as a
pleasant one, as he and his wife visited Haiti to see their daughter
Yanick Georges.137 During their stay in rural Ba de Saint-Anne,
Georges’ wife contracted cholera and had to be physically carried
on the backs of her loved ones to the local treatment center.138 After
his wife lost consciousness, Georges himself began to experience
the telling symptoms of the cholera infection and died, while his
wife, lying in a wooden cot just down the hall, remained unconscious for another three days.139 For fear of contracting the disease,
Georges’ daughter and other children were not permitted to see him
just before and after his death.140 All they could do was scrape
enough money together to buy a coffin for their father’s body.141
The coffin was sealed for burial before his children ever got the
chance to say goodbye.142 Georges’ wife recovered after the death
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of her husband, but was not immediately told of his death for fear of
the shock being too much for her weakened body.143
In addition to these stories, there are the letters sent to the U.N.
every day as a reminder of the continuing misery that the victims
experience.144 Politès Rozye wrote the following to the U.N. following his battle with cholera:
I caught cholera from drinking untreated water because my family does not have enough money to buy
treated water. When I caught the sickness I lost control of my body. I could not stop vomiting or having
diarrhea, which made me very dehydrated, and I
wished I was dead.145
Twenty-seven-year-old Saintume Julienne was affected with
cholera in February 2012. Her letter detailed her experience battling
cholera while pregnant:
I salute you in the name of Jesus in heaven. I had
diarrhea, vomiting, aches all over and I was 8 months
pregnant. I was in danger and my husband had to borrow a motorcycle to take me to the hospital in Mirebalais. When I got there the doctor put me on IV
treatment. I spent 6 days at the hospital and later,
with the grace of God, I gave birth.146
Finally, there is the photograph of Elisa Osman.147 In it she is
being propped up from behind with the help of Nurse Stacy Brown
in a Samaritan’s Purse cholera treatment facility.148 The extra aid
was needed so that Osman could breastfeed her child, as she was too
weak to hold her newborn baby because of the effects of contracting
cholera.149 If only the reader could see the image itself.
143
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It is these stories that remind us that human suffering in Haiti is
even more pervasive now than it was when the cholera outbreak first
occurred. The epidemic has only worsened, and cholera is now considered endemic to Haiti.150 It is now being reported that, in a more
recent ten-year plan proposed by then U.N. Secretary-General Ban
Ki-moon, an estimated $2 billion is necessary to completely eradicate cholera in Haiti.151 However, at current donation levels, the
U.N. estimated it would take forty years to eliminate the disease.152
IV. BRINGING THE HAITIAN CHOLERA CRISIS TO THE INTERNATIONAL STAGE
As discussed, the strategy of holding the U.N. accountable based
on a breach of contract theory is not yielding any results.153 Without
a change in strategy, conditions in Haiti will likely only persist.154
The U.N.’s actions in Haiti and lack of response to the cholera epidemic need to be addressed. Its refusal to do so led to the first time
the U.N.’s special rapporteurs have criticized the agency, stating that
its mediocre and “clearly insufficient” response to the issue “challenges the credibility of the [U.N.] as an entity that respects human
rights.”155 The problem faced by the victims in Haiti is not just a
Haitian problem, but a human one. Informed by this perspective,
Part IV argues for a shift towards a more human-rights based approach to addressing the cholera epidemic in Haiti.

150
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A. Shifting to a More Human-Rights-Based Approach to Challenge U.N. Absolute Immunity
The international organization claiming absolute immunity is
the same organization that, on December 10, 1948, made history
with the creation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(“UDHR”) by the General Assembly.156 Though not binding law,
the UDHR was, for the first time, an international effort to establish
that "fundamental human rights . . . [are] universally protected.”157
It consists of thirty articles that detail the individual rights inherent
to every human and has been translated into over 500 languages.158
Followed by the UDHR were the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (“ICCPR”) and the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (“ICESCR”).159 Both are multilateral treaties adopted by the U.N. General Assembly and put into
force on March 23, 1976, and January 3, 1976, respectively.160 They
are also both binding commitments by those member states that have
signed and ratified the conventions into domestic law.161 The ICCPR
binds parties to uphold and respect civil and political rights, such as
the right to be free of cruel and unusual punishment and the right to
free speech.162 Such rights pertain to an individual’s ability to participate in the civil and political life of the society and state without
discrimination or repression. The ICESCR, conversely, commits
parties to aspire to respect human rights that are usually found to

156
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affect the domestic sphere of individuals, such as the right to an adequate standard of living and healthcare.163 Together, these three
bodies of work––the UDHR, ICCPR, ICESCR, and the two Optional Protocols––are known as the International Bill of Human
Rights that nation states refer to when dealing with violations of human rights.164 Many would say what happened in Haiti was a clear
violation of human rights.165
While the battle to circumvent U.N. absolute immunity through
a breach of contract argument seems to be a losing one, using a human-rights based argument may give victims the opportunity they
have been searching for. There is a growing consensus that “international organizations are bound by international law.”166 The logic
behind this is that it would be unjust for member states, who individually are held accountable for human rights violations, to come
together to form a union that is then not held accountable for human
rights violations.167
For example, the European Court of Human Rights has presided
over a number of cases about whether to enforce absolute immunity
for the European Union in light of human rights violations and the
resulting lack of alternative mechanisms to address such human
rights violations.168 One of the most illuminating cases is Siedler v.
Western European Union.169 The case arose when a terminated em163
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ployee of the Western European Union (“WEU”) was awarded compensation by an internal appeals commission of the WEU.170 When
the employee learned she was entitled to a higher compensation
package according to Belgian Labour legislation, the employee filed
suit against WEU before the Labour Tribunal of Brussels. 171 When
the Labour Tribunal awarded the employee with a higher package,
the WEU appealed, arguing that the tribunal violated the organization’s immunity of jurisdiction.172 The appeals court affirmed the
Labor Tribunal and held,
Because the internal procedure concerning the settlement of administrative disputes within the WEU did
not offer the guarantees inherent to a fair and equitable legal process, the limitation on the access to the
normal courts by virtue of the organization's jurisdictional immunity, was incompatible with Article 6(1)
of the Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms[.]173
Thus, the previous judgment by the Labour Tribunal was affirmed.174
The possibility that the U.N. could be held accountable for human rights violations despite having immunity, like the WEU, is encouraging, but unlikely. The biggest concern for those favoring absolute immunity, which the Second Circuit echoed in the Georges
opinion, is the argument of efficiency: to tear apart the veil of absolute immunity would inevitably open the floodgates of lawsuits from
individuals seeking relief for the various acts of the U.N. or its hundreds of thousands of peacekeeping troops, which would hinder the
U.N.’s ability to realize its mission of peace.175
However, though the U.N. is a much larger organization and has
a much broader reach around the world than the WEU, even those
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within the U.N. seem to discount this “slippery slope” argument.176
In a letter to the Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights,
five special rapporteurs appointed by the U.N. specifically addressed the U.N.’s response to the cholera outbreak in Haiti.177 The
rapporteurs recognized the U.N.’s tendency to use Section 29 to
foreclose the possibility of receiving claims, even though Section 29
was originally intended to provide victims with a venue to bring
forth claims so as to promote due process.178 In response to commentators defending the U.N.’s application of Section 29, the rapporteurs stated:
In a variety of situations the United Nations has managed to devise innovative solutions that have sought
to achieve just outcomes that accord with its human
rights commitments and these have not, despite fears
expressed at the time, led to an unmanageable opening of the floodgates that are so often invoked to prevent new approaches being shaped.179
Along with Section 29, Article 2 of the ICCPR ensures that any
individual whose human rights have been violated “shall have an
effective remedy, notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.”180 The only reason
victims of the cholera outbreak sought to legally overcome the
U.N.’s immunity is that the U.N. failed to provide a standing claims
commission, even though Section 29 of the SOFA between Haiti
and the U.N. required one.181 If the U.N. were to provide for an alternative mechanism to settle disputes, then challenges to the U.N.’s
absolute immunity would likely be few and far between.
Another, more complicated issue is the age-old question of
blame. The U.N.’s use of peacekeeping forces, who have distinct
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legal status, makes it difficult to ascertain who bears the responsibility when a human rights violation occurs. Forces from various
member states remain under the exclusive authority of the U.N. during their period of deployment in furtherance of U.N. peace missions, and yet these same forces are still in the service of and owe
allegiance to their respective states.182 The question then becomes,
if peacekeeping troops violate human rights, is it the U.N. or the
member state who provided the troops that should be held liable for
the violations? Furthermore, if the U.N. is found responsible, do all
member states contribute to compensate victims, or only the member state that sent the culpable troops?
Tom Dannenbaum, who “insists that the U.N. is also legally
bound by international human rights law,” dealt with this very issue
by creating a new liability framework reinterpreting the principle of
“effective control” to apportion responsibility.183 This principle
within the human rights regime holds that international human rights
law can be applied to states acting outside of their own territory and
exerting their control over other specific individuals.184 Dannebaum
applies this principle to the actions of peacekeeping forces.185 He
divides these actions into five different categories, each category
having a different entity—either the U.N., member state, or the
peacekeeper himself—exerting control.186 The following three categories are included: (1) peacekeepers who violate human rights
through an act beyond the scope of their U.N. authority; (2) peacekeepers who commit violations under the authorization of a U.N.
commander or superior within the Security Council; and (3) peacekeepers whose actions, carried out under the orders of the U.N.,
would not only violate human rights, but would rise to the level of a
war crime.187 Based on which entity is exerting “effective control,”
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one could determine whether the U.N., member state, or peacekeeper himself is held to be accountable for the violation and responsible for compensation.188
Despite the difficulty of answering who is to blame and for how
much, nation states still seem to be willing to question the U.N.’s
absolute immunity when the lack of access to courts and/or due process becomes an issue. 189 Similar to the court in Georges, several
other national courts have adjudicated cases against the U.N. using
similar constitutional arguments about the lack of access to courts
and, thus, courts have upheld U.N. immunity.190 But those courts
have consistently noted the incompatibility between U.N. absolute
immunity and international human rights.191 They desire to protect
an individual’s ability to have a venue to seek a remedy.192
If international courts are willing to hold smaller international
organizations responsible for human rights violations, then it stands
to reason that an individual may be able to bring a human-rightsbased claim to overcome U.N. absolute immunity. The victims of
the cholera outbreak have pleaded with the U.N. in vain to erect a
standing claims commission and have exhausted their options within
the United States legal system.193 It is time to try something new,
and the cholera outbreak in Haiti is the perfect case to try such an
experiment in the human rights realm.
B. The Opportunity Exists, but Where Should This Opportunity
Be Seized?
Using a human-rights-based argument to challenge the U.N.’s
immunity is one option.194 The next question is, in which forum
should the victims of the cholera outbreak bring such a case? The
choice of a forum could be the difference between the U.N.’s immunity acting as an impediment and the U.N. being found guilty of
violating a human right in an official and public capacity. As this is
a novel issue, it is difficult to predict with certainty which forums
188
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provide the best opportunity for success. There are, however, clues
as to which forum is probably best, based on the structure and procedures of each. I suggest that the Human Rights Council is the best
option for the Haitian victims to obtain a favorable opinion against
the U.N. Obtaining a favorable judgment, or at the very least presenting the merits of the case in a formal setting, plays a role in a
long-term chain of events that can benefit not only the Haitian victims, but also the entire human rights regime.
One option, although not ideal, would be for the victims to bring
their human-rights-based case back to the federal court in New
York. Because some of the victims were United States residents,
they have jurisdiction to bring a claim in United States federal
court.195 In Brzak, discussed earlier, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals made it clear that the U.N. enjoys absolute immunity at all
times unless it expressly waives immunity.196 The broad language
of the case foreclosed the victim’s initial breach of contract argument.197
While the human-rights-based argument of a lack of access to
courts may provide a novel reinterpretation of the General Convention, the victims would still have an issue with standing. As of today,
the government of Haiti still has not indicated whether it would pursue action against the U.N. Thus, United States v. Garavito-Garcia,
which prevents individuals from challenging violations to international treaties, would still prevent the victims from challenging the
U.N.’s immunity.198 Unless the Haitian government were to involve
itself in the cholera dispute, it is very likely that the United States
federal court would dismiss the case once again and uphold U.N.
immunity, thereby adding to the precedent that the U.N.’s immunity
is unbreakable.
A second option is to bring the case to the International Criminal
Court (“ICC”), a forum in which it would be difficult for the victims
to obtain a favorable judgment. The ICC has jurisdiction to prosecute individuals for the international crimes of genocide, crimes
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against humanity, and war crimes.199 The ICC can exercise its jurisdiction only when existing national judicial remedies have been exhausted or when it is referred a case by the United Nations Security
Council.200 Though the ICC inevitably deals with human rights violations, its focus is on criminal cases. 201 While thousands of deaths
have resulted from the cholera epidemic and the cause can be traced
to the U.N., one could hardly argue that the actions of the peacekeepers in Haiti rise to the same level of malicious intent of other
individuals who commit war crimes that the ICC usually hears. In
other words, there is no evidence that the carelessness of the peacekeepers in failing to maintain sewage or properly respond to the resulting cholera outbreak rises to the level of criminal conduct necessary to be heard by the ICC.
A third option is to file a complaint with the International Court
of Justice (“ICJ”), the main judicial organ of the U.N.202 The ICJ
oversees and settles disputes submitted to it by states, which are
known as contentious cases. 203 It also renders advisory opinions on
legal questions referred to it by authorized U.N. organs and specialized agencies.204 The ICJ can render legally binding decisions in
contentious cases. Because only states may be parties to a contentious case,205 Haiti would have to become involved in the cholera
dispute. Further, international organizations like the U.N. cannot appear before the court in contentious cases.206 Finally, even if Haiti
became involved and the ICJ makes the unlikely decision that the
U.N. is a state, the decisions are only legally binding if both state
parties agree to the court’s jurisdiction.207 Considering the six-year
wait for the U.N. to finally admit to its role in the cholera outbreak,
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the idea that it would then submit to the ICJ’s jurisdiction seems farfetched.
Due to the inherent procedural problems of other venues and forums for this unique situation, the Human Rights Council provides
the most likely avenue for the claims of Haitian victims to be heard,
and for the victims to win a favorable opinion. The Human Rights
Council is an inter-governmental body within the U.N. and was created in March of 2006 through a U.N. resolution.208 The Council is
responsible for promoting and protecting human rights around the
world and is composed of forty-seven seats filled by member states
elected for three-year terms.209
The Council established a complaint procedure through a U.N.
resolution on June 18, 2007.210 It allows individuals and organizations to bring forth claims of human rights and fundamental freedoms violations “occurring in any part of the world and under any
circumstances.”211 Because it allows individuals to bring forth
claims, Haitian cholera victims would not have to depend on the
state of Haiti to bring a claim of its own.212 Though it is the norm
that complaints brought to the Council are against nation states,
nothing in the U.N. resolution that created the complaints procedure
explicitly prevents individuals from bringing a claim against an international organization such as the U.N.213 Furthermore, the Council’s review of human rights violations does not require that states
or international organizations ratify or agree to the jurisdiction of
any particular human rights treaty.214
Complaint review and examination are done by two different
groups under the Human Rights Council—the Working Group on
208
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Communications and the Working Group on Situations.215 The two
groups are responsible for communicating with the state or organization in question about human rights violations and working towards a resolution.216 If the two groups find a persistent pattern of
violations and bring it to the attention of the Council, then the Council may take the matter into formal consideration.217 Though the procedure is usually confidential, there are circumstances in which the
Council has made public the human rights violations and the entity
responsible.218
If the Human Rights Council were to take up the matter and
make public that human rights violations occurred as a result of U.N.
actions, that simple act could have a profound impact. That the
Council’s conclusion carries no legal consequences is unfortunate;
but, there are still benefits to be gleaned. The Haitian victims’ success in obtaining a formal and public opinion from a prominent human rights international body would be the first step to overcoming
the idea that the U.N.’s immunity is absolute and could lead to future
binding decisions.
The same theories used to describe the normalization of human
rights during a time when the phrase “human rights” was a novel
idea, can perhaps be applied to the normalizing of U.N. accountability. Students familiar with human rights regimes are likely also familiar with the fundamental models of norm internalization.219 In
1998, Katherine Sikkink and Magaret Keck co-authored a revolutionary book entitled “Activists Beyond Borders.”220 In this book,
the authors examine and detail the role of transnational advocacy
networks in domestic and international politics.221
Based on months of observation and study, Sikkink and Keck
noticed a recurring pattern between activists and nation states who
commit human rights violations, coining the phrase the “boomerang
215
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model.”222 The boomerang model applies where individuals in a
given country are unsuccessful in persuading the government to
change its behavior and cease its violation of some kind of human
right.223 As a result, activist groups organize and call on the help of
other activist groups in foreign nations.224 These other groups,
which now have become a transnational advocacy network, begin to
exert pressure on their own governments to name and shame the
government that is committing the human right violation.225 Now
that there is international pressure, that government is more likely to
change its behavior and cease the violation of a human right.226
A great example of this model was the campaign to stop deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon, which originated within the country itself and then became the focus of activist groups in different
parts of the world.227 A network of activists from all over the world
successfully used what Keck and Sikkink called “information politics.”228 The activists gathered and disseminated pertinent information to local residents to incentivize them to take an interest in
land development.229 Then, through the use of accountability politics, the activists pressured the World Bank to create policies for
sustainable development.230
Sikkink then went on, with the help of Martha Finnemore, to
build upon the boomerang model and develop the concept of the
norm life cycle.231 Activists become what Sikkink and Finnemore
call norm entrepreneurs, and as such, have the conviction that something must be done when they witness a human rights abuse.232
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Norm entrepreneurs are usually motivated by altruism and empathy.233 These norm entrepreneurs use existing organizations to create norm platforms and campaigns.234
This first stage is called norm emergence.235 After these norms
emerge, the next stage known as norm cascade occurs when international organizations begin to promote such norms in the hopes of
reaching a broader audience.236 Take, for example, the promotion of
the UDHR after widespread human rights abuses during World War
II. Then, states begin to adopt these norms due to the pressure exerted by these international organizations and to enhance their own
domestic legitimacy even if there is no domestic pressure for them
to do so.237
The final stage is norm internalization.238 Over time nation states
and the citizens within them begin to internalize these norms.239 The
norms become codified with domestic law and become so common
place that to imagine a world without such a norm would be difficult.240 For example, the norm of the woman’s right to vote is now
so internalized that many women born in the modern age could
hardly imagine a world where they were not allowed to vote.241 Yet,
such a thing did not exist in the past and only came about through
the work of advocacy groups and norm emergence.
The beginning of a norm life cycle is already being witnessed in
terms of U.N. absolute immunity following the cholera outbreak in
Haiti. Norm entrepreneurs, who witnessed what it meant for victims
of human rights abuses by U.N. peacekeepers to not have access to
a court because of U.N. absolute immunity, have already emerged
challenging the U.N.’s absolute immunity.242 Organizations like the
Institute for Justice and Democracy in Haiti have begun to promote
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the idea that the U.N. should not enjoy absolute immunity if it fails
to provide for an alternative mechanism to settle disputes.243 For
these reasons, an official opinion from the Human Rights Council
stating that a human rights violation has occurred in Haiti, and that
the U.N. itself is responsible, would be significant despite the fact
that the opinion would have no direct legal consequences. Rather,
the opinion would attack the legitimacy of the U.N.’s immunity and
hopefully initiate widespread pressures similar to those that arose
from the Brazilian government’s attempts to deforest the Amazon.244
Just as in stage two of Sikkink’s norm life cycle, where states
begin to adopt norms to gain legitimacy, the U.N. might begin to
adopt the norm of a modified immunity in order to maintain its credibility.245 In the same letter submitted to the U.N. High Commissioner, the special rapporteurs stated:
The effective denial of the fundamental right of the
victims of cholera to justice and to an effective remedy is difficult to reconcile with the United Nations’
commitment to ‘promote and encourage respect for
human rights’. We thus believe that the nonreceivability approach undermines the reputation of the
United Nations, calls into question the ethical framework within which its peace-keeping forces operate,
and challenges the credibility of the Organization as
an entity that respects human rights.246
An opinion from the Human Rights Council could lead to the
changed behavior of the U.N. as well as influence nation states to
really consider modifying the U.N.’s immunity protection. Ideally,
that norm will become internalized and codified in both international and domestic law over the course of coming years. For Haitian
victims now, an opinion from the Human Rights Council recognizing a human rights violation could reinvigorate the campaign to help
stop the spread of cholera and to compensate the victims.
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CONCLUSION
The ideas proposed in Part IV of this Note are novel and untested. Yet, they provide a sliver of hope for not just the victims of
the cholera outbreak in Haiti, but for victims from all over the world
who suffer abuses from the U.N. and its peacekeeping forces. The
realm of human rights is still a complex web that is ever-growing
and ever-changing, allowing for the opportunity to test new approaches to solve old problems. Of these proposed solutions, an
opinion by the Human Rights Council condemning the U.N.’s actions in Haiti and questioning the value of U.N. immunity seems the
most realistic and potentially most impactful. Though the idea of
utilizing a human rights-based approach to solve the issue of U.N.
absolute immunity is an option, the U.N.’s reluctance to
acknowledge its shortcomings suggests that such an option will take
years, if not decades, to develop and effect change within the U.N.
Therefore, it is also important to be aware of and implement more
pragmatic practices that will protect the rights of victims in the
short-term, such as advocating for and ensuring the establishment of
alternative dispute resolution mechanisms when conducting peacekeeping operations.
The most ideal policy would be for states to negotiate SOFAs
that include an express waiver agreement. The inclusion of express
waiver agreements would not only tackle the issue of immunity being dealt with in this Note, but also allow for the discussion of the
actual merits of human rights abuse cases. While smaller steps like
amended SOFAs are a start, major policy changes are needed to
combat the U.N.’s ability to escape the consequences of its actions.
Tens of thousands of deaths in Haiti are attributable to the U.N.’s
reluctance to take responsibility for its actions in the cholera outbreak. To prevent future tragedies, the international community
must pick up where organizations like the Institute for Justice in
Haiti left off and question whether the U.N. deserves to enjoy absolute immunity. Because the U.N. has found that it is morally just to
shame nation states into compliance in the past, it is only fair that
the international community now return the favor, lest the U.N.
plans to continue living in a glass house.

